What is the scope of our conscious mental agency, and how do we acquire self-knowledge of it? Both questions are addressed through an investigation of what best explains our inability to form judgemental thoughts in direct response to practical reasons. Contrary to what Williams and others have argued, it cannot be their subjection to a truth norm, given that our failure to adhere to such a norm need not undermine their status as judgemental. Instead, it is argued that we cannot (...) form judgements at will because we subjectively experience them as responses to epistemic reasons, and because this is incompatible with our experiential awareness of direct mental actions, such as instances of imagining. However, this latter awareness does not extend to indirect agency, which relies on epistemic or causal processes as means. Judging may therefore still count as an indirect action - just like, say, breaking a window by throwing a stone. (shrink)

Dorian Gray pays a hefty price for years of sin and vice in this completely unabridged edition of The Picture of Dorian Gray.

In this chapter, I argue against empiricist positions which claim that empirical evidence can be sufficient to defeasibly justify aesthetic judgements, or judgements about the adequacy of aesthetic judgements, or sceptical judgements about someone's capacity to form adequate aesthetic judgements. First, empirical evidence provides neither inferential, nor non-inferential justification for aesthetic opinions. Second, while empirical evidence may tell us how we do respond aesthetically to artworks, it cannot tell us how we should respond to them. And, third, empirical insights into (...) the irrationality of many of our aesthetic judgements do not warrant the sceptical conclusion that we ought to refrain from forming aesthetic opinions. As a consequence of these limitations to aesthetic empiricism, we should endorse the rationalist position that aesthetic criticism is largely a matter of reasoning and, moreover, a collective undertaking. (shrink)

Introduction 11 PART I: THE HALLE YEARS Chapter One: The Rehabilitation of the Imagination in Husserl’s Early Thought. 17 §1. Brentano’s Rehabilitation of Intentionality and the Problem of Imagination. §2. Husserl and the Breakthrough of Phenomenology. §2.1 The Meaning-Bestowing Act as ‘the Peg from which Everything hangs.’ §2.2 Consciousness is not a Container. §2.3 ‘A Difference that cannot be Phenomenologically Reduced.’ §3. Imagination as an Authentic, Intuitive Intentionality. PART II: THE GÖTTINGEN YEARS Chapter Two: Irreconcilable Differences: Imagination and Image Consciousness. (...) 71 §1. Separations, Convergences, and Goodbyes §2. A nothing in the midst of things that sees me. §3. Wrestling with the angel of Imagination. §4. Images of Productive Phantasy. Chapter Three: The Garden of the Forking Paths: On Time Consciousness. 107 §1. Picking up an Ancient Cross. §2. Continuum of Continua. §3. In Search of Time Lost. Chapter Four: Absence and the Absolute: The Revisions of Phantasy and Time-Consciousness. 143 Recapitulation: Cutting loose the baggage of the ‘Content for an Apprehension and Apprehension’ Schema. §1. The Concept of an Absolute Consciousness and the Embedment of Contents. §2. Transcendental Phenomenology and the Opening Up of a Closed Field. §3. The Breakthrough on the Contents of Consciousness. §3.1. ‘Consciousness through and through’ §3.2. Ambiguities of Immanence. §4. Primary and Secondary Memory revisited. §5. The New Account of Internal Time Consciousness. Chapter Five: The Breakthrough of the Life of Phantasy: Recollection and Pure Phantasy. 187 §1. Introducing the Pure Ego. §2. The Pending Problem of Belief in Presentifications. §3. Recollection and Internal Time Consciousness. §3.1. The Characterization of Recollection as Consciousness ‘Once Again’ following the Revision of the Schema. §3.2. Recollection as a Modified Appearance and a Directedness toward the Past Object. §3.3. Recollection as the Reproductive Modification of the Internal Consciousness of a Past Act. §4. The Differentiation of Recollection and Pure Phantasy on the basis of Internal Time-Consciousness. PART III: THE FREIBURG YEARS AND BEYOND Chapter Six: The Subject in Image: Husserl’s Revisiting of Image-Consciousness. 239 §1. Introducing the Concept of Perceptual Phantasy. §2. The Subject in Image. §3. Is There Temporality in Image?. §4. Revisiting the Theory of Image-consciousness as Depiction. §5. Pictoriality and Phantasy Temporality. Chapter Seven: ‘Myth that is Truest Memory:’ Phantasy and the Literary Work of Art. 303 §1. Theater and Drama. §2. Is the Literary Work of Art Itself Imaginary? §3. The Literary Work as an Idea with a Temporality. §4. Phantasy and the Consciousness of Possibility. Parting Words on Poetry and Philosophy. Bibliography: 361. (shrink)

Los procesos democráticos de toma de decisiones pueden ser evaluados por sus resultados, por su valor intrínseco o por una combinación de ambas cosas. Mostraré que analizar a fondo estas alternativas permite sacar a la luz las debilidades más serias en los modos usuales de justificación del constitucionalismo. La fundamentación teórica de la articulación entre democracia y constitucionalismo ha permanecido atrapada en una trampa que busco romper. Concluiré mostrando la necesidad de rebasar los argumentos epistémicos y contra-epistémicos sugiriendo pautas que (...) hasta ahora creo han sido poco ponderadas en la literatura clásica sobre el tema. (shrink)

Der Fokus dieser theologischen Analyse der ethischen Argumentationen und Positionen der deutschen Ärzteschaft seit 1945 liegt auf den Grenzen des Lebens und den entsprechenden Richtlinien und Stellungnahmen der Bundesärztekammer (BÄK). Welche Positionen und Begründungsmuster haben sich gewandelt - welche nicht? Was waren aktuelle Auslöser - welche Tendenzen zeichnen sich für das ärztliche Ethos ab? Welche Parallelen und Differenzen zu anderen Institutionen ergeben sich? Im Zentrum stehen zwei methodische Herangehensweisen: Eine detaillierte Analyse der historischen...

Los últimos años del siglo XX han coincidido con el fin de unos procesos seculares en la historia de la humanidad, con la acentuación de algunos de sus problemas más acuciantes y con el nacimiento de desafíos nuevos que la especie humana ha de afrontar y a los que ha de responder. Este libro prentende contribuir a la clarificacíon y toma de conciencia de esta situación y aportar planteamientos e ideas para la respuesta a esos problemas y desafíos.

I argue that a standard formulation of hinge epistemology is host to epistemic relativism and show that two leading hinge approaches (Coliva’s acceptance account and Pritchard’s nondoxastic account) are vulnerable to a form of incommensurability that leads to relativism. Building on both accounts, I introduce a new, minimally epistemic conception of hinges that avoids epistemic relativism and rationally resolves hinge disagreements. According to my proposed account, putative cases of epistemic incommensurability are rationally resolvable: hinges are propositions that are the objects (...) of our belief-like attitudes and are rationally revisable in virtue of our overarching commitment to avoid systematic deception in our epistemic practices. (shrink)

Considering the case of Juan de Vilanova y Piera, often celebrated as the first scientist to accept the prehistoric antiquity of palaeolithic paintings, we explore some of the problems related to the concept of ‘precursor’ in the field of the history of science. In the first section, we propose a brief history of this notion focusing on those authors who have reflected critically on the meaning of predecessors. In the second section, the example of Vilanova illustrates the ways in which (...) historians of science have created precursors. From the vantage of modern science, precursors have traditionally been defined as those who first indicated or announced ideas or theories later accepted by the scientific community. As a result, they have been represented as ‘heroes’ struggling hard to defeat the ignorance of their time. As the case of Juan de Vilanova illustrates, this traditional view is unsatisfactory in many ways. For this reason we consider in the third section a number of methodological strategies to promote a more adequate approach to pioneers. In particular, we suggest that the best way to surmount hagiographical approaches to past scientists is to put them in their own intellectual and historical contexts. (shrink)

Begründet und entfaltet wird ein Begriff des Spiels, der sich um Lockungen und Drohungen des Unerwarteten dreht. Das Autorenduo ordnet seine Theorie der ludischen Aktion in klassische Konzepte des Spiels ein sowie in den aktuellen Diskurs der Game Studies. Die phänomenale Mannigfaltigkeit des Spiels wird in historischer Perspektive skizziert und in systematischer Weise gegliedert. Die Autoren erläutern medientechnische und kommunikative Voraussetzungen des Booms der Computerspiele und reflektieren die Diskussion über Eskalationen ludischer Gewalt. Kritisch ausgeleuchtet werden Instrumentalisierungen des Spiels, die sich (...) unter dem Stichwort Gamification wachsender Beliebtheit erfreuen. Die auffällige Inflation der Spielmetapher wird in Zusammenhang gebracht mit ludischen Anmutungen in den sozialen Strukturen der modernen und digitalen Gesellschaft. Fabian Arlt, M. A., hat Medienmanagement studiert und promoviert im Studiengang Gesellschafts- und Wirtschaftskommunikation der Universität der Künste (UdK) in Berlin. Prof. Dr. Hans-Jürgen Arlt ist Sozialwissenschaftler und Publizist, er lehrt am Institut für Theorie und Praxis der Kommunikation der Universität der Künste (UdK) in Berlin. (shrink)

Este trabajo reconstruye la comprensión ontológica que de fondo actúa en la tematización diferente del fenómeno de la caída en Heidegger y Marcuse. Se sostiene que la extensión de la “diferencia ontológica” es esencialmente distinta dada la “corrección dialéctica” de la fenomenología exigida por Marcuse. Frente a una comprensión originariamente temporea del ser se sitúa otra que introduce en el desenvolvimiento temporeo del ser una dimensión normativa. Con ello se impone una comprensión fundamentalmente diferente de la caída. Las indicaciones acerca (...) de esta problemática son elaboradas desde la recepción particular de la filosofía hegeliana que cada uno lleva a cabo. (shrink)

Philosophy &Public Affairs, Volume 51, Issue 2, Page 166-190, Spring 2023.

I argue against the Standard View of ignorance, according to which ignorance is defined as equivalent to lack of knowledge, that cases of environmental epistemic luck, though entailing lack of knowledge, do not necessarily entail ignorance. In support of my argument, I contend that in cases of environmental luck an agent retains what I call epistemic access to the relevant fact by successfully exercising her epistemic agency and that ignorance and non-ignorance, contrary to what the Standard View predicts, are not (...) modal in the sense that knowledge is. After responding to objections, I conclude by sketching an alternative account of ignorance centered on the notions of epistemic access and epistemic agency. (shrink)

In this paper, I describe and discuss two mental phenomena which are somewhat neglected in the philosophy of mind: focused daydreaming and mind-wandering. My aim is to show that their natures are rather distinct, despite the fact that we tend to classify both as instances of daydreaming. The first difference between the two, I argue, is that, while focused daydreaming is an instance of imaginative mental agency, mind-wandering is not—though this does not mean that mind-wandering cannot involve mental agency at (...) all. This personal-level difference in agency and purposiveness has, furthermore, the consequence that instances of mind-wandering do not constitute unified and self-contained segments of the stream of consciousness—in stark contrast to focused daydreams. Besides, the two kinds of mental phenomena differ in whether they possess a narrative structure, and in how we may make sense of the succession of mental episodes involved. (shrink)

The concept of the universe is used in physical cosmology differently from the usual meaning of the term, naively considered as the entire reality. Traditionally, thinking about the whole led to logical contradictions. Taking as reference the Kantian antecedent, different contemporary philosophical notions of the universe are analysed in the first part of this paper, including realist and constructivist approaches, as well as a notion of the universe as a physical object. In the second part, the specific notion from the (...) standard physical cosmology is discussed. Although modelling the universe as a physical system provides a specific way to define some global properties, the universe as a whole remains empirically inaccessible. Hence, the discussion about the under-determined global properties depends ultimately on philosophical preferences. Under these circumstances, it is argued that the realist interpretation of such properties becomes problematic because it leads to unstable conclusions. Finally, it is argued that the notion of the universe as conceived in standard cosmology is not necessarily consistent with an approach that considers it to be a physical object. (shrink)

A growing body of evidence in cognitive psychology and neuroscience suggests a deep interconnection between sensory-motor and language systems in the brain. Based on recent neurophysiological findings on the anatomo-functional organization of the fronto-parietal network, we present a computational model showing that language processing may have reused or co-developed organizing principles, functionality, and learning mechanisms typical of premotor circuit. The proposed model combines principles of Hebbian topological self-organization and prediction learning. Trained on sequences of either motor or linguistic units, the (...) network develops independent neuronal chains, formed by dedicated nodes encoding only context-specific stimuli. Moreover, neurons responding to the same stimulus or class of stimuli tend to cluster together to form topologically connected areas similar to those observed in the brain cortex. Simulations support a unitary explanatory framework reconciling neurophysiological motor data with established behavioral evidence on lexical acquisition, access, and recall. (shrink)

The prevalent idea that semiosis is evolutionary is a driving point for biosemiotic research, starting from the Peircean premises of continuity and including a large number of views on how signs evolve. In this paper I wish to add a small pinch of skepticism to an otherwise productive point of view. Briefly, the question to be asked is: Is there any proper and fair connection between the logical abstraction of signs, genetic expressions interpreted as signs and the animal usage of (...) signs? And how do we go about answering this? Instead of attempting a negative account of the possibility of an evolutionary view of biosemiosis, I will attempt to make an argument in favor of skepticism as a way to make a more fine-grained distinction across the areas where biosemiotic thinking seems to have some impact. The aim is then to find philosophical strategies to overcome this skepticism when possible, while also raising some awareness about the possible limits of current biosemiotics regarding the ideal evolutionary chain of signs. Ultimately, the idea is reexamining some core assumptions of the biosemiotic point of view at its most general, accounting for some possible ways in which theory may move forward. The potential incompatibility of theoretical standpoints between some of the different approaches that may be taken is, it will be argued, a desirable outcome for biosemiotic research. That is, the way we deal with the possible theories on the evolutionary continuity of signs will also affect our different research programs, and having a nuanced philosophical discussion on it can only contribute to the expansion and clarification of where different positions within biosemiotics currently stand. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to link empirical findings concerning environmental inequalities with different normative yard-sticks for assessing whether these inequalities should be deemed unjust, or not. We argue that such an inquiry must necessarily take into account some caveats regarding both empirical research and normative theory. We suggest that empirical results must be contextualised by establishing geographies of risk. As a normative yard-stick we propose a moderately demanding social-egalitarian account of justice and democratic citizenship, which we take to (...) be best suited to identify unjust as well as legitimate instances of socio-environmental inequality. (shrink)

Resumen En 1976, Nagel y Williams presentaron -en una reunión de la Aristotelian Society- dos célebres textos dirigidos a exhibir el desafío que el azar y la fortuna representan para la imputación kantiana de responsabilidad moral. Desde entonces han proliferado cientos de artículos centrados en analizar este dilema. Dicho debate, no obstante, rara vez es situado al interior del análisis de las implausibles y falsas premisas que dan lugar a él. En este trabajo reconstruyo las coordenadas centrales en las que (...) esta problemática filosófica se origina. Posteriormente muestro que la imputación de responsabilidad ética a un agente no sólo no excluye, sino incluso presupone, lo que llamaré una capacidad impura de agencia donde la suerte ocupa un lugar central.In 1976, Nagel and Williams presented -at the congress of the Aristotelian Society- two famous texts aimed at exposing the challenge that chance and fortune represent for moral thought. Since then, hundreds of articles have proliferated in the literature focused on analyzing this dilemma. This debate, however, is rarely situated within the analysis of the implausible and false premises that give rise to it. In this paper I reconstruct the central coordinates in which this philosophical problem originates. Later, I show that imputation of ethical responsibility to an agent not only does not exclude, but even presupposes, what I will call an impure capacity for agency where luck occupies a central place. (shrink)

Aunque el debate jurídico entre Hans Kelsen y Carl Schmitt ha sido extensamente discutido y analizado, rara vez se lo sitúa en el marco de la disputa entre el mundo político antiguo y el moderno. La pérdida de este punto central de referencia impide focalizar la raíz filosófica de fondo en la polémica entre ambos autores, a saber, una batalla entre dos modelos alternativos de racionalidad política y moral. Uno es el antiguo (reivindicado por Schmitt) y otro el moderno (defendido (...) por Kelsen). Sostengo que no situar dicho debate en semejante contexto nos priva de comprender las implicaciones jurídicas que se desprenden del conflicto entre los supuestos teóricos normativos que hacen surgir a la Modernidad y el horizonte teleológico que da lugar a la Antigüedad. While the legal debate between Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt has been widely discussed and analyzed, it is rarely located within the coordinates of the political dispute between the ancient and modern world. The loss of this central point of reference prevents focusing on the deeply philosophical root wich is in the midst of the controversy between the two authors, namely, a battle between two alternative models of political rationality and morality. One is the ancient (claimed by Schmitt) and the other is the modern (defended by Kelsen). i argue that not placing this debate in such context deprives us from understanding the legal implications arising from the conflict between the normative theoretical assumptions that give rise to Modernity and the teleological horizon which gives rise to the ancient world. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungDie Geschichte der genetischen Pränataldiagnostik ist bislang als Teil der Geschichte der Humangenetik und deren Neuorientierung als klinisch-laborwissenschaftliche Disziplin in der zweiten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts betrachtet worden. Anhand neuen Quellenmaterials soll in diesem Beitrag gezeigt werden, dass das Interesse an der Pränataldiagnostik in Westdeutschland auch im Kontext von Forschungen entstand, die sich mit Gefahren für den Menschen in der Umwelt befassten. Anhand der Debatten um die Einrichtung des DFG-Schwerpunktprogramms „Pränatale Diagnostik genetischer Defekte“ 1970 untersuchen wir, wie die Technik der (...) Amniozentese in Westdeutschland von einer interdisziplinären Forschungsgruppe eingeführt wurde, die sich mit Schädigungen des Organismus durch Strahlen, Arzneimittel und andere Gebrauchsstoffe und Konsumgüter befasste. In einer als ökologische Wende bezeichneten Zeit wachsenden Umweltbewusstseins, so unsere These, sollte durch die Förderung der Pränataldiagnostik eine wahrgenommene Lücke in der Prävention umweltbedingt auftretender genetischer Anomalien geschlossen werden. Für die Pränataldiagnostik als „Schutzmaßnahme“ sprach unter anderem ihre erwartete Finanzierung als Krankenkassenleistung im Zuge der Reform des Abtreibungsrechts. Erst in einem zweiten Schritt führten Veränderungen von Strukturen der Forschung, vor allem aber Erfahrungen in der gynäkologischen Praxis zu einer Neuausrichtung auf die Diagnostik und Prävention mehrheitlich erblicher oder spontan auftretender Anomalien. Die Pränataldiagnostik, so wie sie schließlich in Westdeutschland ab den frühen 1980er Jahren routinemäßig Einsatz fand, hatte mit Fragen der „Umwelt“ kaum noch zu tun. Diese Fallstudie zur Frühgeschichte der genetischen Pränataldiagnostik handelt von dem noch wenig untersuchten Verhältnis von humangenetischer Forschung, klinischer Praxis und Umweltforschung und hat zum weiteren Ziel, den bisher in anderen Kontexten beschriebenen Wandel von Perspektiven in der Vorsorge um 1970 zu beleuchten. (shrink)

In recent years, there has been a surge in research addressing the question which properties predictive algorithms ought to satisfy in order to be considered fair. Three of the most widely discussed criteria of fairness are the criteria called equalized odds, predictive parity, and counterfactual fairness. In this paper, I will present a new impossibility result involving these three criteria of algorithmic fairness. In particular, I will argue that there are realistic circumstances under which any predictive algorithm that satisfies counterfactual (...) fairness will violate both other fairness criteria, that is, equalized odds and predictive parity. As will be shown, this impossibility result forces us to give up one of four intuitively plausible assumptions about algorithmic fairness. I will explain and motivate each of the four assumptions and discuss which of them can plausibly be given up in order to circumvent the impossibility. (shrink)

The problem of algorithmic fairness is typically framed as the problem of finding a unique formal criterion that guarantees that a given algorithmic decision-making procedure is morally permissible. In this paper, I argue that this is conceptually misguided and that we should replace the problem with two sub-problems. If we examine how most state-of-the-art machine learning systems work, we notice that there are two distinct stages in the decision-making process. First, a prediction of a relevant property is made. Secondly, a (...) decision is taken based (at least partly) on this prediction. These two stages have different aims: the prediction is aimed at accuracy, while the decision is aimed at allocating a given good in a way that maximizes some context-relative utility measure. Correspondingly, two different fairness issues can arise. First, predictions could be biased in discriminatory ways. This means that the predictions contain systematic errors for a specific group of individuals. Secondly, the system’s decisions could result in an allocation of goods that is in tension with the principles of distributive justice. These two fairness issues are distinct problems that require different types of solutions. I here provide a formal framework to address both issues and argue that this way of conceptualizing them resolves some of the paradoxes present in the discussion of algorithmic fairness. (shrink)

The systematic importance of the eidetic account of phantasy for Husserlian phenomenology in general is undisputed, but whether this account can be relevant for Aesthetics has often been put into question. In this paper I argue that Husserl’s rich phenomenology of phantasy, and in particular his account of perceptual phantasy, can nevertheless significantly enhance our understanding of how we recognize and imaginatively participate in artistic fictions. Moreover, I show how Husserl’s peculiar formulation of a non-intuitive phantasy at stake in artistic (...) representation anticipates some uses of the imagination in Aesthetics suggested by Ernst Gombrich and Kendall Walton. (shrink)

This article considers Theodor W. Adorno’s thesis of the ‘liquidation of the individual’ as a contribution to the critique of political economy insofar as it links structural economic imperatives o...

This thesis aims to clarify a number of conceptual aspects of the debate surrounding algorithmic fairness. The particular focus here is the role of causal modeling in defining criteria of algorithmic fairness. In Chapter 1, I argue that in the discussion of algorithmic fairness, two fundamentally distinct notions of fairness have been conflated. Subsequently, I propose that what is usually taken to be the problem of algorithmic fairness should be divided into two subproblems, the problem of predictive fairness, and the (...) problem of allocative fairness. At the core of Chapter 2 is the proof of a theorem that establishes that three of the most popular (predictive) fairness criteria are pairwise incompatible. In particular, I show that under certain conditions, a predictive algorithm that satisfies a criterion called counterfactual fairness will with logical necessity violate two other popular predictive fairness criteria called equalized odds and predictive parity. In Chapter 3, a new predictive fairness criterion is developed using a mathematical framework for causal modeling. This fairness criterion, which I call causal relevance fairness, is a relaxation of another popular fairness criterion, counterfactual fairness, but turns out to be more closely in line with philosophical theories of discrimination. In Chapter 4, another infamous impossibility result in algorithmic fairness is analyzed through the lens of causality. I argue that by using a causal inference method called matching, we can modify the two fairness criteria equalized odds and predictive parity in a way that resolves the impossibility. Lastly, Chapter 5 contains an empirical case study. In it, the fairness of a popular recidivism risk prediction tool is analyzed using the criteria of (predictive) fairness developed earlier. (shrink)

Charles S. Peirce’s philosophy of signs, generally construed as the foundation of current semiotic theory, offers a theory of general perception with significant implications for the notion of subjectivity in organisms. In this article, we will discuss Peirce’s primary claims in semiotic theory, particularly focusing on their relevance to biosemiotics. We argue that these claims align with certain areas of the philosophy of biology, specifically epistemological and ontological considerations, despite the limited formal interaction between disciplines. This article serves as a (...) general introduction to Peircean biosemiotics as a philosophical perspective on biological subjectivity. (shrink)